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Our paper aims to examine the impact of an “objective” measure for 
the quality of transparency and disclosure practice that is extracted 
from the Egyptian corporate governance guidelines on the 
performance of a selected sample of 85 Egyptian listed companies. 
We use mixed methods (i.e. content analysis, regression analysis, 
questionnaires and interviews) to test the relationship between the 
transparency and disclosure index and corporate performance for 
the period 2006-2010. We found no significant relationship between 
transparency and disclosure practice and corporate performance. 
Our results suggest that governance mechanisms such as 
transparency and disclosure practices are considered to be just ink 
on paper without any actual value added adopting corporate 
governance in Egypt. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Following the agency theory, corporate governance 
literature shows that effective implementation of 
corporate governance practices (including 
transparency and disclosure practices) affects 
corporate performance. Research on developed 
stock markets shows a positive relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate financial 
performance as well as numerous studies show that 
corporate governance increases valuations and 
boosts the bottom line.  
Sound corporate governance practices can 
generally play in an emerging capital market as the 
Egyptian. The vital role that the Egyptian corporate 
governance guidelines specifically serves in 
compensating for the lack of protection in a civil law 
system, it is found crucial to investigate the impact 
of transparency and disclosure as an internal 
corporate governance mechanism on performance 
of Egyptian listed companies. The motivation 
towards conducting this study generally comes from 
the fact that the impact of disclosure on firm value 
is still an empirical issue (Hassan et al. 2009). 
Additionally, although many researchers have 
examined corporate governance in developed 
nations, there is little direct empirical evidence on 
disclosure/governance-performance in general and 
for emerging markets in particular (Velnampys 
(2013), Gürbüz et al. (2010), Yasser et al. (2011), 
Sami et al. (2011), Hassan et al. (2009), Omran et al. 
(2008), Reed, (2002) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). 
Second, developing and emerging countries have 
intended to mimic the practices of developed 
nations, despite evidence, for example from Rabelo 
and Vasconncelos (2002), of the presence of 
differences between the factors giving rise to the 
need for corporate governance in developing 
nations. Third, there are structural variations, such 
as the dominance of government and/or family/ 
close held companies that render the 
implementation of Western style corporate 
governance both of questionable value and 
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troublesome (Mensah, 2002). Fourth, there are major 
differences between the emerging countries of 
Eastern European and China, as there are between 
countries in the Middle East, North Africa and sub-
Saharan Africa (Euro money, 2007; Fawzy, 2004). 
Finally, while there exist an increasing convergence 
among national and international corporate 
governance codes, there are also still significant 
deviation in terms of disclosure practices and 
content of disclosure between countries (Bhuiyan 
and Biswas, 2007). 
Moreover, most studies – using the Egyptian 
context - do not investigate the impact of the 
transparency and disclosure practices included in 
the Egyptian corporate governance code on the 
performance of listed companies. Accordingly, we 
aim to fill this gap by examining the impact of the 
transparency and disclosure practices as an internal 
corporate governance mechanism on corporate 
performance.  Thus, the main research question is: 
Does transparency and disclosure practices 
included in the Egyptian Corporate Governance 
Code impact the performance of listed companies? 
Thus, this paper contributes to existing 
literature by providing a better understanding of the 
transparency and disclosure practices adopted in a 
developing , non-Anglo-American country that has 
not been extensively examined. This paper is being 
the first in the Egyptian context to investigate the 
impact of an objective transparency and disclosure 
(TD) index and a questionnaire that is extracted 
from the Egyptian corporate governance guidelines 
on the performance of a sample of 85 Egyptian 
listed companies included in EGX100 index. It also 
addresses transparency and disclosure practices 
over a period (2006-2010) of considerable changes 
in the business environment in general and the 
capital market in particular as referred to by 
Soliman (2013). Furthermore, the paper contributes 
to existing literature on the Egyptian capital market 
by validating its quantitative findings through a 
number of interviews with managers of Egyptian 
listed companies.  
Accordingly, the paper can be of interest to 
both managers and investors, because of the 
influence of transparency on the domestic and 
foreign investments which is vital for a developing 
country such as Egypt. 
Our results shows no impact of transparency 
and disclosure practices as an internal corporate 
governance mechanism on Egyptian listed 
companies’ performance. The qualitative findings 
collected through a number of interviews showed an 
equal consensus on the fact that in the Egyptian 
capital markets’ case, compliance with the corporate 
governance practices embedded in the Egyptian 
stock exchange listing rules and the Egyptian 
Corporate Governance guidelines specifically  have 
turned into some administrative steps that has no 
actual baring or effect on Egyptian listed companies 
performance, apart from multinational and foreign 
entities which are relatively few in number in the 
local market. Consequently, governance mechanisms 
(such as transparency and disclosure practices) are 
considered to be “just ink on paper without any 
actual value added to any company that is required 
to adopt corporate governance in Egypt”. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of the 
current literature and the research hypotheses. 
Research methodology, data collection and 
information sources, are presented in Section 3. 
Section 4 provides a discussion of the empirical 
results obtained from the transparency and 
disclosure index while Section 5 presents the 
empirical results and findings of the TD 
questionnaire. Section 6 presents the qualitative 
findings of the conducted interviews that support 
our quantitative output. Finally, the research 
conclusions and suggestions for future work are 
presented in Section 7. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Demand for a high level of transparency (through 
better disclosure and timely reporting) can arise 
from the information asymmetry problem and 
agency conflicts between management and outside 
investors (Healy and Palepu,2001). Thus, enhanced 
corporate transparency and disclosure is believed to 
mitigate these problems by reducing information 
asymmetry between outsiders and corporate 
insiders and between institutional shareholders and 
minority shareholders (Haat et al., 2008). Increased 
transparency and disclosure is argued to reduce the 
uncertainty surrounding the estimation of stock 
returns leading to the decrease in the rate of return 
required by investors to hold the firm’s shares, 
hence the firm’s cost of equity will fall and firm 
value will rise. Moreover and as a result of a 
reduction in agency problems (Lambert, Luez, and 
Verrecchia, 2007; Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2003) 
expect increased disclosure to reduce the amount of 
cash flows that managers and controlling 
shareholders appropriate for themselves and 
accordingly lower the cost of monitoring. In this 
context, Coffee, 1999 and Stulz 1999 therefore 
suggest that increased disclosure may increase the 
cash flow that shareholders receive. 
On the other hand, Wagenhofer (2004) 
challenge the above mentioned traditional view of 
disclosure effects and argue that the effects of 
disclosure depend on three factors; uncertainty, 
multi person settings with conflicts of interest, and 
information asymmetry. Thus, based on the 
assumptions made about these factors, it can be 
possible to predict a negative relationship between 
increased transparency and disclosure and firm 
value. In this essence, Hassan et al. (2009) argue that 
more public disclosure can reduce the acquisition of 
private information by market participants leading 
to the reduction in the total amount of information 
available in the capital market. More public 
information may also have a negative net benefit if 
the information places a firm at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to its rivals. 
Furthermore, information might have a 
negative value if investors perceive themselves to be 
worse off in the case of the company disclosing 
information which might be exploited to their 
detriment. Investors might suspect or misinterpret 
the intentions of the company in providing more 
information to the market without an obligation to 
do so. This argument is even more valid especially 
in the secretive environment that controls the 
Egyptian financial markets and the Egyptian culture 
in general (Samaha & Stapleton, 2008). Moreover, 
Abd-Elsalam (1999); Dahawy et al. (2002); Fawzy 
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(2003); PSCU (2000); ROSC (2002) refer to the lack of 
an effective enforcement policy for noncompliant 
companies has contributed to the low levels of 
compliance with mandatory disclosure among listed 
companies in Egypt. This suggests that the costs of 
noncompliance may be negligible besides implying 
that the introduction of the new Egyptian corporate 
governance code has not improved information 
symmetry and thus may not have a positive impact 
on Egyptian listed companies’ performance. 
Hence this study investigates the impact of the 
level of transparency (more specifically the level of 
disclosure and timeliness of reporting) on listed 
companies’ performance in Egypt. Our motivation is 
enhanced given the little empirical evidence with 
regard to the relationship between transparency and 
disclosure as a corporate governance mechanism 
and firm value for emerging markets in general and 
particularly Egypt as will be presented further in 
this section. 
Hassan et al. (2009) examined the value of 
voluntary and mandatory disclosure in the Egyptian 
capital market which applies International 
Accounting Standards (IAS).  Their empirical results 
show that mandatory disclosure has a highly 
significant but negative relationship with firm value 
while voluntary disclosure has a positive yet 
insignificant association with firm value The authors 
justified this puzzling result from a traditional 
perspective by that mentioning that it is consistent 
with the predictions of analytical models which 
emphasize the complex interplay of factors 
determining the relationship between disclosure and 
firm value. 
 On the other hand, Samaha and Dahawy (2010) 
studied the impact of both corporate governance 
characteristics as well as company characteristics on 
voluntary disclosure using the annual reports of the 
30 most active share trading firms in Egypt. They 
found no significant relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and profitability while high liquidity is 
related to greater voluntary disclosure which again 
is not in conformity with the author’s predicted 
direction. These findings were justified by referring 
to the highly secretive Egyptian culture which in 
return directly impacts the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in the Egyptian capital market. 
Desouky and Mousa (2012), investigated the 
impact of firm characteristics including 
performance related ones such as liquidity on 
transparency and disclosure as a main pillar of 
corporate governance. The main drawback of this 
study which despite aiming towards investigating 
the impact of firm characteristics on transparency 
and disclosure a main pillar of corporate 
governance, the authors did not develop their 
transparency and disclosure index from the items 
included in the Egyptian corporate governance 
guidelines which was already issued in 2006. 
Another drawback is using the data of only one year 
and thus not tracking the transparency and 
disclosure practices of listed companies after the 
initial issuance of the Egyptian corporate 
governance guidelines. They found an insignificant 
relationship between liquidity and the transparency 
and disclosure index which contradicts with Samaha 
and Dahawy (2010) findings which showed that high 
liquidity is related to greater voluntary disclosure. 
Soliman (2013) investigated the association 
between the voluntary disclosure level in annual 
reports and firm characteristics (including 
profitability) of more active 50 Egyptian companies 
He finds that profitability has a significant positive 
association with voluntary disclosure which to some 
extent contradicts Hassan et al. (2009) and Samaha 
and Dahawy (2010) findings above.   
Additionally, Shehata et al. (2014) examined 
the relationship between firm characteristics and 
mandatory disclosure level in the Egyptian context. 
Findings of the correlation analysis which was 
conducted to test the relationships between the 
dependent variable; disclosure level, and the 
independent variables; (assets, sales, debt ratio, debt 
equity ratio, assets in place, company age, return on 
equity, profit margin, return on assets, liquidity, 
business type, foreign activity, and auditor type) 
revealed that the most correlated variables with 
disclosure level are the sales and foreign activity 
variables (at 0.05 level) while the auditor type is 
significant at the 0.01 level. On the other hand, 
liquidity had a negative relationship while all 
profitability proxies showed an insignificant 
relationship with disclosure level. The findings 
contradict with Hassan et al (2009) who found that 
mandatory disclosure has a highly significant but 
negative relationship with firm value. 
Based on the previously presented literature, it 
is notable the lack of studies that tended to 
investigate the impact of transparency and 
disclosure as a main pillar for corporate governance 
practices in the Egyptian capital market using a tool 
that is developed from the Egyptian corporate 
governance guidelines itself despite the fact that 
most of these studies were conducted after the 
issuance of the guidelines in 2006. Moreover, only 
one study (Hassan et al., 2009) in the Egyptian 
context aimed to investigate the value relevance of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure while all other 
studies aimed to examine the impact of specified 
firm characteristics on the transparency and 
disclosure level among listed companies yielding 
contradicting results. Even Hassan et al.’s (2009) 
study used data relating to the period 1995-2002 
which was before the issuance of the Egyptian 
corporate governance guidelines. Consequently, this 
paper will aim to fill the exiting gap in the Egyptian 
literature by conducting a study that aims to 
investigate the value relevance of transparency and 
disclosure as a main corporate governance 
mechanism using a tool that is extracted from the 
Egyptian corporate governance guideline itself. In 
this regard, the proxy for corporate transparency 
and disclosure (which in this paper is the 
independent variable) will be that suggested by 
(Hassouna and Ouda, 2015) along with nine 
independent control variables which namely are 1) 
firm size as in [Bebczuk (2005), Kim and Yoon 
(2007) and Omran et al. (2008)], 2) financial leverage 
as in [Abdel Shahid (2003), Black et al. (2004), 
Barontini and Caprio (2006), Bebczuk et al. (2004), 
Bebczuk (2005), Mustafa (2006), Kim and Yoon 
(2007), Javed and Iqbal (2007), Bhagat and Bolton 
(2007), Amran and Ahmad (2010) and Lee (2011)], 3) 
firm age as in [Gompers et al. (2003), Black et al. 
(2004), Bebczuk et al. (2004), Bebczuk (2005), Brown 
and Caylor (2006), Amran and Ahmad (2010) and 
Gürbüz  et al. (2010)], 4) Industry type as in [Black et 
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al. (2004), Barontini and Caprio (2006), Bhagat and 
Bolton (2007) and Lee (2011)], 5) Auditor type as in 
[Aljifiri and Moustafa (2007), Qasim et al. (2011) and 
Qasim (2014)], 6) sales(firm) growth as in [Black et 
al. (2004) and Gompers et al. (2003)], 7) capital 
intensity (asset tangibility) as in [Klapper and Love 
(2002), Sayed (2007) and Gürbüz et al. (2010)], 8) 
capital expenditure as in [Bebchuk et al. (2004) and 
Gompers et al. (2003)] and 9) liquidity as in Lee 
(2011) . On the other hand, four ratios will be used 
as a proxy for firm performance (dependent 
variable) including the 1) return on equity (ROE) as 
in [Abdel Shahid (2003), Omran et al. (2008), Kholief 
(2008) and Omidfar (2017)], 2) return on assets 
(ROA) as in [Klapper and Love (2002), Holmstrom 
and Kaplan (2003), Solikhah (2017)], 3) TOBIN’s Q as 
in [Klapper and Love, (2000), Bebczuk (2005), 
Mustafa (2006), Sharma (2016) and Makhdoom 
(2016)] and 4) the market/book value (MBV) ratio as 
in [Black et al. (2004) and Droptez et al. (2004)]. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
To investigate the effect of the transparency and 
disclosure level on the performance of Egyptian 
listed companies, this study uses 4 ratios to proxy 
for firm performance (independent variable) as 
mentioned in the previous section. These proxies 
have been commonly used in the Egyptian context in 
similar studies thus to yield comparable results they 
are used in this paper. The transparency and 
disclosure level (dependent variable) will be 
measured using the “Transparency and disclosure 
index” suggested by Hassouna and Ouda (2015). 
Accordingly, the index will include a total of 32 
objective indicators which are originally extracted 
from the Egyptian corporate governance guidelines 
as this study is aiming towards examining the 
impact of transparency and disclosure practices as a 
main internal corporate governance mechanism. 
Additionally, nine control variables will be included 
in the model based on the fact that they have been 
extensively used in similar corporate governance-
firm performance literature studies besides the 
availability of data in the Egyptian market which 
also restricts the authors from calculating and 
including other possible control variables in the 
tested model. 
H1: There is a significant relationship between 
the transparency and disclosure index and the 
performance of the Egyptian listed firms. 
Hence, to test for the above listed research 
hypothesis, we use the following model: 
 
FP= α + β1TD1-32(i,x) + β2FSIZE(i,x) + β3FLEV(i,x) + β4SALESGRTH(i,x) + β5LIQUIDITY(i,x) + 
β6CAPEX(i,x) + β7CAPINT(i,x) + β8SECTYPE(i,x) + β9BIG5NOT(i,x) + β10FIRMAGE(i,x) + ε (i,x) 
(1) 
 
where:  
FP = Firm performance measured by ROE, ROA, 
Tobin’s q and M/BV ratios. 
TD
1-32 
= Transparency and disclosure level. 
FSIZE = firm size. 
FLEV = financial leverage. 
SALESGRTH = sales growth ratio. 
LIQUIDITY = liquidity ratio. 
CAPEX = capital expenditure. 
CAPINT = capital intensity. 
SECTYPE = sector type. 
BIG5NOT = external auditor is one of big 5 
auditing firms or not (dummy variable). 
FIRMAGE = firm age (dummy variable). 
I = firm (i). 
X = year X (ranging from 2006 till 2010). 
ε 
(i,x)
 = error term for firm (i) at year (x). 
 
The components of the above regression model 
are further discussed in the below sub-sections. 
3.1. Transparency and Disclosure Index - Indicators 
(Independent Variable) 
 
The transparency and disclosure mechanism was 
included in extensive literature corporate 
governance indexes including that of Black et al. 
(2001, 2004, 2006, and 2009), Drobetz and 
Zimmermann (2004), Cheung et al. (2007) and Javed 
and Iqbal (2007) above demonstrates the 32 
objective index indicators that were extracted from 
the recommendations required by the Egyptian 
corporate governance guidelines 2005 and amended 
in the year 2011. The Transparency and disclosure 
index score is based on a binary system (0, 1), where 
a score of “one” is given to each corporate indicator 
that proves to be present in the listed company and 
a “zero” placed for each indicator that proves not to 
be present. For more details on the constituents and 
the scoring process of the index, refer to Hassouna 
and Ouda, (2015). 
 
3.2.  Performance (Dependent) Variables 
 
In general, researchers used two alternative 
approaches to measure corporate performance. The 
accounting measures of corporate performance and 
the market measure of performance (i.e. Tobin’s Q 
ratio). Martin (1993) suggests that Tobin’s Q and 
accounting measures “should be regarded as 
complements rather than substitutes. Both contain 
information about market power, and there is no 
compelling reason to think that either type of 
measure dominates the other”. For this reason, we 
use both measures of corporate performance. . 
Accounting measures have included ROA, ROE and 
ROI. The paper uses ROA and ROE as in Klapper and 
Love (2002), Omran and Fatheldin (2002), Abdel 
Shahid (2003) as well as Bebczuk (2005). It is 
necessary to note that the fundamental evaluation 
of companies, measured by, its financial indicators 
such as (ROA and ROE) are the most important 
factors used by investors in Egypt to assess 
company’s performance as referred by Abdel Shahid 
(2003). Accordingly, both indicators are used as 
accounting measures of corporate performance.  
Market valuation measures have been 
presented in the literature to support the use of the 
Tobin’s Q ratio as an appropriate measure for 
corporate performance. For instance, Tobin’s Q ratio 
is a long term measure that takes risk and return 
dimensions into account (Manuel et al. 1996) and 
reflects the firm’s ability to improve performance 
overtime (Caton et al. 2001). Similarly, Salinger 
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(1984) argue that Tobin’s Q ratio is better than 
single period measures of profits, as it recognizes 
the present value of the future profits.  
Finally, the market/book value (MBV) ratio: is 
used widely in the empirical studies of finance and 
investment particularly after the study of Fama and 
French (1992). Studies in the area of corporate 
governance include Abdel Shahid (2003) and Omran 
and Fatheldin (2002). 
 
3.3. Data Collection 
 
The data collection process involves using mainly 
listed companies annual reports for the years 2006 
to 2010 as well as relevant information disclosed on 
official websites to fill the constructed 
"Transparency and disclosure index" which will 
include 23 indicators. The remaining 9 indicators 
will form an objective "Transparency and disclosure 
questionnaire" which is distributed among the same 
sample of listed companies used to fill the index. 
However, the questionnaire covers year 2010 only as 
will be further justified in the following sections. 
 
3.4. The Sample 
 
The sample includes 85 companies listed in EGX100 
for the years 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010. 
Fifteen companies of EGX100 listed companies’ are 
excluded from the sample due to the insufficiency 
of data. It is worth mentioning that the Egyptian 
stock exchange introduced on 2 August 2009, the 
new price index, the EGX 100 Price Index, which 
tracks the performance of the 100 active companies, 
including both the 30 constituent companies of the 
EGX 30 Index and the 70 constituent companies of 
the EGX 70 Index. In addition, it measures the 
change in the companies' closing prices, without 
being weighted by market capitalization, and was 
retroactively computed as of 1 January 2006, as well 
as covering most of the sectors included on the 
Egyptian stock exchange. Accordingly, the sample 
companies will relate to the following major sectors:  
1. Building material and construction; 
2. Chemicals;  
3. Communication; 
4. Electrical equipment and engineering; 
5. Entertainment; 
6. Financial services; 
7. Health and pharmaceuticals; 
8. Textiles and clothing. 
 
3.4.1. Method of Data Collection 
 
Data is primarily obtained from the annual reports 
of listed companies published from 2006 through 
2010. In addition to annual reports, websites (if 
present) of the sample companies is also used as 
well as data disclosed by the Egyptian Exchange sent 
originally by the listed companies and thus 
disclosed to shareholders on their behalf in the 
form of disclosure books or documents disclosed on 
the Egyptian Exchange website (www.egyptse.com). 
Data is also collected using COFACE Egypt financial 
yearbook for the years being studied.  
In order to cover the extracted objective 
transparency and disclosure indicators that are not 
required to be disclosed in listed companies’ annual 
reports, a questionnaire was also distributed among 
the sample of listed companies including 9 
transparency and disclosure indicators. Worth-
noting that it was initially aimed to collect data for 
the same time period as that of the index (for years 
2006 till 2010) but due to: 1) the  unavailability of 
documented historical data on corporate 
governance among Egyptian listed companies 
especially that this data is not required for 
disclosure in listed companies’ annual reports and 
2) the availability of this type of historical data 
depends on listed company's staff and its turnover 
which is unstable particularly when considering a 
five year duration (from 2006 to 2010), the data 
collected by the questionnaire was limited to the 
year 2010. 
 
3.4.2. Statistical Technique 
 
To investigate the impact of transparency and 
disclosure as an internal corporate governance 
mechanism on each of the selected performance 
ratios, step-wise regression will be used as a 
statistical technique. 
Employing step-wise regression will primarily 
provide an empirical output which demonstrates the 
percentage change in the dependent variable (firm 
performance) which is caused by the independent 
variable (The transparency and disclosure index and 
its 32 indicators). Accordingly, the impact of the 
transparency and disclosure index as a whole (as 
well as each individual indicator in the index) on 
every performance ratio can be determined for the 
sample companies during the pre-set range of years. 
This represents the main objective of the empirical 
examination demonstrated by the main hypothesis 
presented in this paper. 
Secondly, step-wise regression technique 
provides the advantage of the automatic selection of 
the significant independent variables (which 
includes the transparency and disclosure index, 
control and dummy variables) constructing the 
regression model constructed in this paper. 
Consequently, the step-by-step iterative 
construction of the model will eliminate those 
independent variables that are not statistically 
significant which results in a clearer empirical 
output of the significant independent variables 
impacting firm performance. 
Thirdly, stepwise regression will not only 
eliminate the insignificant variables in the tested 
explanatory models, but will also display the 
direction of significance for each significant 
independent variable constructing the model. The 
direction of the significant relationship will be 
demonstrated in the coefficient tables which are one 
of the most important empirical output tables 
resulting from employing stepwise regression. The 
direction of the significant relationship between the 
transparency and disclosure index and every 
performance ratio will consequently be determined 
which in return  provides a better understanding of 
whether the transparency and disclosure practices 
in the Egyptian corporate governance guidelines 
enhance Egyptian listed companies accounting and 
market performance or not. Thus such empirical 
tables provided by the step-wise regression 
statistical technique contributes in a more in-depth 
investigation of the impact of an internal corporate 
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governance mechanism such as transparency and 
disclosure on Egyptian listed companies which is the 
main objective of the constructed hypothesis in this 
paper.  
Finally, step wise regression is widely used in 
related studies in prior research. Accordingly, to 
yield comparable results, step wise regression was 
selected as the main statistical technique after 
testing for the presence of multi-Collinearity and 
endogeneity (as will be presented next section). 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND FINDINGS-TD INDEX 
 
This section will present and analyze the empirical 
results of the tested model and hypotheses relating 
to the extracted transparency and disclosure index 
(23 indicators) and questionnaire (remaining 9 
indicators). As mentioned above, this process starts 
with the conduction of the validity (endogeneity and 
collinearity) tests as shown below. 
 
4.1. Endogeneity Test (Second Stage Least Squares-
2SLS Test) -TD Index 
 
To mitigate the presence of endogeneity (reverse 
causality) in the TD index data, a 2SLS test is 
conducted. It is worth noting that an endogeneity 
problem (high performance firms choose good 
governance rules), can result in causation running 
from our dependent variable (firm performance) to 
corporate governance, rather than vice-versa). As 
per Black et al. (2004), highly performing firms 
could choose better governance structures for 
several reasons. They could choose better 
governance structures because (i) the firm's insiders 
believe that these structures will further raise firm 
value; (ii) firms with high measures of firm 
performance benefit from improved governance 
structures more than other firms; or (iii) the firm's 
insiders believe that doing so will signal 
management quality even if the signal (the 
governance structure) does not in fact affect firm 
performance. 
In the same regard, it is worth noting that our 
main explanatory model includes one explanatory 
variable (namely Total TD) and three instrumental 
variables (namely, Sector type, listed company 
having one of the big 5 auditing companies as its 
external auditor and firm age). An additional 
instrumental variable will be for this test which will 
be named as EGX30 indicating whether the listed 
company is among the most active 30 companies in 
a specific year or not. In this context it is worth 
noting that some important rules apply to EGX 30 
index companies specifically. The index does not 
include companies that commit several repetitive 
breaches to listing and disclosure rules (which 
indicates that it includes companies characterized 
by a relatively high compliance generally with 
corporate governance practices embedded in the 
listing rules), it also excludes companies with less 
than 15% free float (meaning that companies 
involved have a relatively high dispersion of 
ownership compared to other companies excluded 
from the index). 
 
 
 
 
4.2. Co-linearity Test 
 
A co-linearity test is also conducted on the TD index 
data to mitigate the presence of an impact of one of 
the independent variables (including control 
variables) present in the used explanatory models 
on each other. Accordingly, this test is equally 
important as the Endogeneity test in validating the 
collected data and consequently the regression 
results.  
The co-linearity test on the TD data was 
conducted using the co-linearity diagnostics test 
option in the SPSS statistical tool. As for the results 
of co-linearity test option in the SPSS tool, they 
generally indicated a tolerance value which in all 
cases was near to one indicating the absence of a co-
linearity problem in the collected data relating to all 
the independent variables involved in the 
constructed explanatory models. Moreover, the co-
linearity diagnostics tables mostly show Eigen 
values which are greatly less than ten. It is worth 
noting that the Durbin Watson values was not relied 
on when judging the collinearity since the presence 
of collinearity was primarily tested in terms of 
grouping related transparency and disclosure 
indicators and running the regression models of the 
selected performance ratios after controlling for the 
variables mentioned in the previous chapter. The 
results yielded similar regression results as those 
obtained when running the regressions before 
grouping the related transparency and disclosure 
indicators. Accordingly, the Eigen values were relied 
on in terms of judging collinearity. 
 
4.3. Descriptive analysis – TD index 
 
The descriptive analysis of the TD index data as well 
as the performance, control and dummy variables 
collected for the sample of 85 listed companies 
included in EGX100 index mainly shows the 
following: 
The TD index data show that nearly all sample 
companies comply with most indicators except for 
the disclosure of the presence of the audit 
committee (TD19) which indicates that on average 
nearly 50% on average disclose the presence of the 
sample companies disclose the presence of an audit 
committee despite of the fact that is one of the main 
listing rules since 2003 which in return indicates the 
absence of effective enforcement by the 
governmental and regulatory authorities not only 
for the voluntary Egyptian corporate governance 
guidelines but also for the listing rules. Our results 
confirm even more the absence of effective 
enforcement by the supervisory authorities through 
showing that around 79% and for some other 
disclosure practices more than 79% of sample 
companies fail to comply with the disclosure of BOD 
report to shareholders concerning annual operating 
and financial results (TD2) , disclosure of board of 
director’s background (TD5) which confirms with 
Kenawy and Abdelgany (2009) who refer that Egypt 
adheres to the criteria related to publishing all 
statistics and information data except for those 
related to wages and salaries and the central 
government processes.  
In addition results also show no compliance 
with the disclosure of board of director’s basis of 
remuneration (TD7), disclosure of the degree of 
compliance with the Egyptian code of corporate 
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governance (TD13) and the disclosure of social, 
environmental, occupational, health and safety 
policies (TD15) by sample companies as well as the 
disclosure of the presence of a remuneration 
committee (TD20) along with the committee’s 
meetings, assigned functions and accomplishments 
(TD21). Accordingly, it can be concluded that 
Egyptian listed companies do not fully comply with 
mandatory disclosure and that voluntary disclosure 
is rather limited which is in conformity with Hassan 
et al. (2009) findings. 
The descriptive analysis for the control 
variables shows: a) Most EGX100 companies are 
medium sized ones in terms of the log of their total 
assets value, capital expenditure and capital 
intensity results, b) Almost 41% only of the sample 
companies have one of the big 5 auditing firms 
acting as their external auditors which sheds light 
on the possibility of low quality audits being 
performed. 
 
4.4. Relationship between the TD index and firm 
performance 
 
The results of the step-wise regression of the model 
investigating the relationship between the total 
transparency and disclosure index (Total TD) as well 
as the individual TD indicators and the selected 
performance ratios are summarized in Table 1:
 
Table 1. Summary of step-wise regression results-TD index 
 
Performance Ratios 
Significance of overall TD 
index 
Significance of individual TD index indicators 
1) Return on assets 
(ROA) ratio 
Inversely significant 
Inversely significant indicators: 
a) Annual audit being performed by an individual, competent and 
qualified audit (TD
1
). 
b) Disclosure of social, environmental, occupational and safety 
policies (TD
15
). 
c) The existence of investors relations (TD
18
) 
d) Disclosure of the presence of a remuneration committee (TD
20
). 
e) Disclosure of the remuneration committee’s assigned functions, 
meetings and accomplishments (TD21). 
Positively significant indicators: 
a) The disclosure of the degree of compliance with the Egyptian 
corporate governance code (TD
13
). 
2) Market /book 
value (M/BV) ratio 
Not significant 
Inversely significant indicators: 
a) Timely disclosure of financial and operating results (TD
3
). 
b) Disclosure of the presence of an audit committee (TD
19
). 
3) Tobin’s Q ratio Inversely Significant 
Inversely significant indicator: 
a) Disclosure of the presence of an audit committee (TD
19
). 
4) Return on Equity 
(ROE) ratio 
Not significant 
Inversely significant indicator: 
a) Timely disclosure of financial and operating results (TD
3
). 
Positively significant indicator: 
a) Disclosure of the degree of compliance with the Egyptian code of 
corporate governance (TD
13
). 
 
Table 2. Model Summary and Coefficient results of the step-wise regression of the total TD index and the 
ROA ratio 
Note: ROA: Return on Assets 
TOTAL TD: Total transparency and disclosure index score. 
Sample size: 85 companies, No. of Observations: 85 companies X 5 years= 425 
 
4.4.1. Relationship between TD index and ROA 
ratio 
 
Table 2 above implies a significant inverse 
relationship existing between the total TD index and 
the return on assets ratio. Moreover, the coefficient 
Table 3 shows a negatively significant relationship 
between leverage, sales growth, external auditor 
being one of the big 5 companies and capital 
intensity as well as a positive significant 
relationship between both capital expenditure and 
firm age and the ROA ratio. 
As per the aforementioned results, 17 
transparency and disclosure indicators (out of a 
total of 23) present an insignificant relationship 
with the ROA ratio. On the other hand, 5 indicators 
demonstrate an inverse significant relationship 
while only the disclosure of the degree of 
compliance with the Egyptian corporate governance 
code (TD13) indicator is significantly positive to the 
ROA ratio.  These results are supported by Bavudorj 
and Khurelbaatar, (2013) study on Mongolian listed 
companies and Coskun and Sayilir (2012) on 
Turkish listed companies. A possible justification 
for this outcome is the presence of a complex 
interplay of different factors determining the 
relationship between disclosure and firm 
performance. Another explanation is provided by 
Hassan et al. (2009) study which investigated the 
value relevance of disclosure in the Egyptian 
(emerging) capital market. The study referred that 
costs associated with disclosure may have out 
weighted the benefits of such disclosure even when 
penalties for noncompliance were negligible in the 
Egyptian setting. Consequently, the study 
recommended imposing stiffer penalties especially 
on mandatory disclosure requirements which in 
return might encourage greater compliance with 
mandatory disclosure requirements. The 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
ROA .428g .183 .169 
Coefficients results of the total transparency and disclosure index 
Predictors Coefficients Sig. Tolerance VIF 
TOTALTD -.006 .000 .563 1.775 
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enforcement problem was also referred to by 
Dahawy and Conover (2007) study on the 
accounting disclosure of listed companies in the 
Egyptian stock exchange. The findings indicated that 
“the disclosure level for the studied companies 
averaged 61% of the required level that is mandated 
by the Egyptian capital market authority 
requirements that are based on the international 
accounting standards. The authors added that most 
of the non-compliance could be explained by the 
cultural reasons and those companies were selective 
in their choice of what to comply with and what not to. 
 
Table 3. Coefficient results of the step-wise regression of the TD index individual indicators and the ROA 
ratio 
Note: TD13: The disclosure of the degree of compliance with the Egyptian corporate governance code.  
TD1: Annual audit being performed by an individual, competent and qualified audit. 
TD20: Disclosure of the presence of a remuneration committee. 
TD21: Disclosure of the remuneration committee’s assigned functions, meetings and accomplishments. 
TD15: Disclosure of social, environmental, occupational and safety policies. 
TD18: The existence of investors’ relations. 
BIG5NOT:  External auditor is one of big 5 auditing firms or not. 
Sample size: 85 companies, No. of Observations: 85 companies X 5 years= 425 
 
On the contrary, our results are not supported 
by Herly’s (2007) study in Indonesia which 
demonstrated that firm performance measured in 
terms of the return on assets ratio is positively 
related to corporate governance reporting. In 
addition, the evidence provided in this section also 
contradicts Chiang (2005) in Taiwan which also 
indicated that financial transparency and 
information disclosure possess a significant 
relationship with firms operating performance 
measured using the return on assets ratio. These 
contradicting findings originating mainly from 
developing countries prove the argument of the 
presence of mixed literature empirical evidence to 
be valid. 
Thus, as per the aforementioned empirical 
evidence, the results above can indicate the 
presence of an inverse significant relationship 
between the TD index and the ROA ratio at a 0.05 
significance level. Consequently, Hypothesis H1 can 
be accepted. 
 
4.4.2. Relationship between the TD Index and the 
MBV Ratio 
 
Table 1 highlights the absence of a significant 
relationship between the TD index (Total TD) as one 
of the main internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and the market/book value ratio. In 
addition, it presents an insignificant relationship 
existing between the remaining 21 transparencies 
and disclosure indicators and the same ratio. The 
results are in line with those obtained when 
regressing the same index to the return on assets 
ratio as presented earlier in this chapter. In 
addition, our evidence confirms with Hassan et al.’s. 
(2009) study which showed that, after controlling 
for factors such as asset size and profitability, 
mandatory disclosure has a highly significant but 
negative relationship with firm value. This in return 
proves the presence of a complex interplay of 
different factors determining the relationship 
between disclosure and firm value. Gupta et al. 
(2009) and Javed and Iqbal’s (2007) empirical results 
also support our results since they find that their 
disclosure and transparency index has no significant 
effect on firm performance justifying that those 
adequate firm-level governance standards cannot 
replace the solidity of the firm. Accordingly, they 
argue that low production and bad management 
practices cannot be covered with transparent 
disclosures and transparency standards. This 
argument can also be used to justify our presented 
results as they apply to a great extent on Egyptian 
listed companies as well. The results can also be 
related to the problem of enforcement which has 
been also referred to be McGee (2010) in his study 
on the Egyptian capital market referring that 
“Enforcement of the disclosure provisions is 
especially important. The capacity to monitor 
disclosure needs to be strengthened. Staff needs to 
be trained to become aware of the issues and the 
possible abuses".  
On the other hand, the results are not 
supported by Bubbico et al. (2012) in Italy, Abdo and 
Fisher (2007) in South Africa, Cheung et al. (2007) in 
Hong Kong and Black et al. (2004) in Korea who both 
found sufficient evidence to conclude that there is a 
positive relationship between the level of disclosure 
and corporate performance measured in terms of 
the market to book value ratio. The different 
findings can be justified by the variation in the level 
of effective corporate governance implementation 
between both markets on one hand and Egyptian 
market despite of the fact that the Korean market is 
an example of an emerging capital market. 
Predictors Coefficient Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -.023 .651   
Leverage -.013 .000 .725 1.379 
TD13  .082 .000 .469 2.132 
TD1 -.036 .000 .732 1.365 
Capital expenditure .048 .000 .439 2.275 
Sales growth -.014 .000 .790 1.266 
TD20 -.039 .004 .577 1.732 
TD21 -.063 .009 .539 1.857 
Firm age .024 .004 .840 1.190 
Capital intensity -.044 .007 .795 1.258 
TD15 -.090 .002 .707 1.414 
TD18 -.105 .005 .747 1.338 
BIG5NOT -.020 .042 .649 1.540 
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 In summary, the results above indicate the 
absence of a significant relationship between the TD 
index and the MBV ratio at a 0.05 significance level. 
Further individual analysis of the TD indicators 
showed that only two TD indicators were significant 
out of a total of 23 indicators Therefore, Hypothesis 
H1 cannot be accepted. 
 
4.4.3. Relationship between the TD Index and the 
Tobin's Q Ratio 
 
Consistent with the earlier values, the R2 value (refer 
to Table 4 below) indicates that the independent 
variables included in the aforementioned 
explanatory model contributes in predicting only a 
2.9% change in the Tobin’s Q ratio at a 0.05 
significance level. In addition, Table 1 and 4.5 below 
displays a significant negative relationship existing 
between the TD index and firm performance 
measures in terms of the Tobin’s Q ratio. 
 
Table 4. Model summary and Coefficient results of 
the step-wise regression of the total TD index and 
the Tobin’s Q ratio 
Note: TOTAL TD: Total transparency and disclosure 
index score. 
         Sample size: 85 companies, No. of Observations: 85 
companies X5 years= 425. 
 
Table 5. Coefficient results of the step-wise 
regression of the TD index individual indicators and 
the Tobin’s Q ratio 
Note:TD19: Disclosure of the presence of an audit   
committee.  
          Sample size: 85 companies, No. of Observations: 
85 companies X 5 years=425. 
 
Only the disclosure of the presence of an audit 
committee (TD19) signifies a significant negative 
relationship with the Tobin’s Q ratio. Our results, 
resemble those obtained when investigating the 
relationship between the TD index and the ROA and 
MBV ratio’s which all showed significant negative 
relationship existing. Accordingly, the possible 
justifications provided for both ratios equally apply 
on the Tobin’s Q ratio. Additionally, Table 1 
indicates a negative significant relationship existing 
between the disclosure of the presence of an audit 
committee and Tobin’s Q which may also hint to a 
possible significant relationship exiting between 
board committees as a corporate governance 
mechanism and the Tobin’s Q ratio.  
Our results confirm with Hassan et al.’s (2009) 
study on the Egyptian capital market, Herly’s (2007) 
study on Indonesian listed companies as well as 
Javed and Iqbal’s study (2008) on listed companies 
in Pakistani market since their findings show that 
their disclosure and transparency index has no 
significant effect on firm performance justifying 
that those adequate firm-level governance standards 
cannot replace the solidity of the firm. Accordingly, 
they argue that low production and bad 
management practices cannot be covered with 
transparent disclosures and transparency standards. 
This argument can also be used to justify our 
presented results as they apply to a great extent on 
Egyptian listed companies as well.  
On the other hand, our empirical results 
conflicts with Black et al.(2006) in Korea and 
Bubbico et al. (2012) in Italy who all found a 
significant positive relationship between their 
transparency and disclosure practices and the 
Tobin’s Q ratio. These contradicting results can be 
due to the difference between the implementation 
level of corporate governance practices in the above 
mentioned capital markets and the Egyptian one. In 
addition, since this contradicting evidence evolve 
from both developing and developed markets, thus 
this can highlight the absence of consensus among 
the corporate governance literature in this context. 
Summing up, as per the aforementioned empirical 
evidence, the results above can indicate the 
presence of a significant inverse relationship 
between the overall TD index and the Tobin’s Q 
ratio at a 0.05 significance level. Therefore, 
Hypothesis H1 can be accepted.  
 
4.4.4. Relationship between the TD Index and the 
Return on Equity (ROE) Ratio 
 
The R2 value is relatively low (refer to Table 6) 
indicating that the independent predicts only a 
14.4% change in the ROE ratio at a 0.05 significance 
level. In addition, Table 1 highlights the absence of a 
significant relationship between the total 
transparency and disclosure index (Total TD) and 
the ROE ratio as well as a significant relationship 
specifically existing only between the timely 
disclosure of financial and operating results (TD3) 
and the disclosure of the degree of compliance with 
the Egyptian code of corporate governance (TD13) 
as shown in Table 7. Consequently, an insignificant 
relationship exists between the remaining 21 
transparency and disclosure indicators are in line 
with the results obtained when regressing the same 
index to the ROE ratio. 
 
Table 6. Model summary and Coefficient results of 
the step-wise regression of the total TD index and 
the return on equity ratio 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
ROE .379d .144 .135 
Note: ROE: Return on Equity ratio. 
Sample size: 85 companies, No. of Observations: 85 
companies X 5 years= 425. 
 
Table 7. Coefficient results of the step-wise 
regression of the TD index individual indicators and 
the ROE ratio 
 
Predictors Coefficients Sig. Tolerance VIF 
TD13 .099 .001 .730 1.369 
TD3 -.176 .027 .971 1.030 
Note: TD13: Disclosure of the degree of compliance with 
the Egyptian code of corporate governance. 
TD3: Timely disclosure of financial and operating 
results. 
Sample size: 85 companies, No. of Observations:85 
companies X 5 years= 425 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
TOBIN’S Q .172b .029 .025 
Coefficient results of the transparency and disclosure index 
Predictors Coefficients Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 2.763 .000   
TOTALTD -.044 .014 .997 1.003 
Predictors Coefficients Sig. Tolerance VIF 
TD19 -.373 .001 .989 1.011 
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The results are in line with Bavudorj and 
Khurelbaatar (2013) on Mongolian listed companies, 
Coskun and Sayilir (2012) on Turkish listed 
companies, Javed and Iqbal (2008) on listed 
companies in Pakistan. Worth noting that all the 
studies mentioned which support the findings 
provided in this paper belong to developing or 
emerging markets that resemble the Egyptian capital 
market. On the other hand, studies like Black et al. 
(2004) in Korea, Drobetz and Zimmerman (2004) in 
Germany do not support our findings in this regard. 
This can be due to the different implementation 
levels of corporate governance practices especially 
when considering listed companies in a developed 
capital market such as the German capital market.  
Finally in this regard, the results above can indicate 
the absence of a significant relationship between the 
overall TD index and the ROE ratio at a 0.05 
significance level. Therefore, Hypothesis H1 cannot 
be accepted. 
 
4.4.5. Discussion of Empirical Results 
 
Focusing on Egypt’s case, the statistical results are 
not in line with the agency theory that corporate 
governance might mitigate agency problems leading 
to reduced agency cost by aligning the interests of 
controlling owners with those of the company. In 
fact, our empirical evidence points to the presence 
of a complex interplay of factors other than those 
included in the constructed explanatory models 
presented throughout this paper that impacts 
Egyptian listed companies’ performance as well as 
the effective implementation of the Egyptian 
corporate governance guidelines. This conclusion is 
supported by Cheung and Chan (2004), who argues 
that corporate governance, is a product of a 
complex set of cultural, economic and social issues 
and that the governance structures of corporations 
differ from country to country. Accordingly, 
appropriate corporate governance guidelines and 
practice codes must be designed and adopted by 
each constituent country. In the end, corporate 
governance should produce an environment within 
each country that corporations identify with and can 
adhere to in their decision making process. 
Certainly, this seems to be ignored and absent in 
Egypt’s case.  
Our conclusion will additionally be supported 
and complimented by the empirical evidence 
obtained from investigating the impact of the 
remaining nine TD indicators integrated in the 
“objective TD questionnaire” which are not 
disclosed in listed companies’ annual reports (thus 
were not included in the index) on the selected 
performance ratios. This is crucial especially when 
taking into consideration that the insignificant 
relationships between the individual TD indicators 
of the index and the various firm performance 
ratios exceeded the significant relationships as 
presented throughout this part of the paper. 
Accordingly, the transparency and disclosure 
variables included in the questionnaire will be 
further tested in search for more significant 
relationships that may exist between the 
questionnaires’ TD indicators and firm performance 
as will be demonstrated in the following section. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND FINDINGS-TD 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Prior to the conduction of the step-wise regression, 
a reverse causality or endogeneity 2SLS regression 
test is performed. In addition, a co-linearity test is 
conducted to the collected data. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the collected data carries no 
endogeneity problem. Results of the co-linearity test 
also indicated the absence of a co-linearity problem 
in the collected data relating to all the independent 
variables involved in the constructed explanatory 
models. 
 
5.1. Relationship between the TD questionnaire and 
firm performance 
 
The impact of the TD questionnaire on firm 
performance is tested using stepwise regression 
after controlling for the previously mentioned 
selected set of control variables. Accordingly, the 
total TD questionnaire (Total TD) as well as each 
individual TD questionnaire indicator is regressed to 
the four selected proxies of firm performance using 
collected data for the year 2010 only in an effort to 
test for hypothesis H1. A summary of the empirical 
results are presented in Table 8 below: 
 
Table 8. Summary of the step-wise regression 
results-TD questionnaire 
 
Performance 
Ratios 
Significance of 
overall TD 
questionnaire 
Significance of individual 
TD questionnaire 
indicators 
1) Return on 
assets (ROA) 
ratio 
Not significant 
No significant individual 
TD questionnaire 
indicators exist. 
2) Market / 
book value 
(M/BV) ratio 
Not significant 
Positively significant 
indicator: 
a) Company selects 
supplies who are at the 
same occupational and 
ethical level. 
Inversely significant 
indicator: 
b) Internal audit 
manager reports on 
quarterly basis to the audit 
committee. 
3) Tobin’s Q 
ratio 
Not significant 
No significant individual 
TD questionnaire 
indicators exist. 
4) Return on 
Equity (ROE) 
ratio 
Not significant 
No significant individual 
TD questionnaire 
indicators exist. 
 
The regression results of the “transparency 
and disclosure” questionnaire shows no significant 
relationship between the total TD score and the four 
selected firm performance proxies. Accordingly, the 
evidence provided in this section are in line with 
those obtained when regressing the TD index. 
However, the only notable difference between both 
results can be that several transparency and 
disclosure practices in the index showed a 
negatively significant relationship while this is not 
the case with the questionnaire evidence. A possible 
justification can be the difference in the tested 
practices used in the index and questionnaire as 
well as the difference between the periods used in 
both (the index used data for a five year period 
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while the questionnaire data uses only one year 
data).  
Thus, as per our empirical evidence in this 
section, there is no significant relationship between 
transparency and disclosure, control and dummy 
variables included in the above tested model using 
the questionnaire data collected for the year (2010). 
Accordingly, we reject hypothesis H1 with regards 
to the TD questionnaire indicators. 
 
5.2. Commenting on transparency and disclosure 
index and questionnaire results 
 
Our empirical findings demonstrated throughout 
this paper show an insignificant relationship 
between transparency and disclosure indicators 
included in both the index and questionnaire with 
the four selected proxies of firm performance. Even 
those TD practices that were significantly related to 
firm performance presented an inverse relationship. 
Consequently and in line with our conclusion with 
regards to the index, our statistical results confirm 
the contradiction with the agency theory and the 
presence of a complex interplay of factors that 
impacts Egyptian listed companies’ performance 
other than that available in the literature. The 
evidence provided by the analysis of the 
questionnaire data also highlights two main 
problems which are: 
1) The lack of enforcement and effective 
implementation of the Egyptian corporate 
governance guidelines by government regulatory 
and supervisory bodies which has transformed 
corporate governance practices in Egypt to 
administrative steps required for listed companies 
continued operation without reaping the benefits of 
proper implementation. 
2) The voluntary implementation of the Egyptian 
Code Corporate Governance makes the effectiveness 
of its requirements highly questionable especially 
when our empirical evidence shows deficiency in the 
compliance even with listing rules and mandatory 
laws. 
 
6. QUALITATIVE VALIDATION OF EMPIRICAL 
RESULTS THROUGH INTERVIEWS 
 
As a further step towards providing practical and 
empirical justification to our results, qualitative 
validation and support is obtained through 
conducting a number of interviews with the general 
or financial managers of Egyptian listed companies 
included in our sample is vital in providing more 
insight of the conditions present in the Egyptian 
capital market in this regard. 
Accordingly, a total number of 10 interviews 
with the general or financial managers of 10 
Egyptian listed companies (including service, 
manufacturing and construction listed companies) 
available in our sample were conducted aiming to 
answer three main questions which are: 
1) What are the main factors that affect your 
company's performance (whether internal or 
external)? 
2) Do you perceive that implementing the 
Egyptian corporate governance guidelines affects 
your company's performance? How? 
3) What in your opinion can be done to enhance 
the actual implementation of the Egyptian corporate 
governance guidelines among listed companies? 
Answers to the first main question revealed 
that in the Egyptian capital market context, internal 
factors such as firm size, sales growth, leverage, 
liquidity, capital intensity, capital expenditure, 
sector type, external auditor being one of the big 5 
external auditors and firm age (which were included 
in our tested explanatory model and presented in 
the literature) were not directly referred to as main 
factors impacting Egyptian listed companies’ 
performance. This in return can support our 
empirical evidence presented by the low R2 value 
obtained throughout our statistical output 
presented in the previous sections.  
More importantly, is the fact that  the 
transparency and disclosure mechanism in specific 
was not directly referred to as one of the factors 
impacting Egyptian listed companies performance 
which in return supports our empirical evidence 
showing a large number of insignificant 
relationships existing between the various tested 
individual transparency and disclosure indicators 
and the various firm performance ratios.  
Answers of the 2nd question regretfully 
confirmed a consensus on the fact that in the 
Egyptian capital markets’ case, compliance with the 
Egyptian corporate governance guidelines or with 
the corporate governance practices embedded in the 
Egyptian stock exchange listing rules have turned 
into some administrative steps that has no actual 
baring or effect on Egyptian listed companies 
performance, apart from multinational and foreign 
entities which are relatively few in number in the 
local market. Consequently, governance mechanisms 
such as transparency and disclosure practices are 
considered to be “just ink on paper without any 
actual value added to any company that is required 
to adopt corporate governance in Egypt” as quoted 
by the general manager of a listed company that is 
considered to be one of the pioneers in adopting 
corporate governance practices even before it was 
required by laws and listing regulations. Hence, this 
is in line with our empirical evidence demonstrating 
more insignificant relationships between the 
transparency and disclosure mechanism and its 
related individual indicators and Egyptian listed 
companies’ performance. 
As for the 3rd Interview question, the following 
steps were recommended: 
a) The presence and effective implementation of 
sound auditing and accounting criteria and practices 
in both public and private economic entities that are 
consistent with internationally accepted standards. 
This will contribute in curbing widespread 
corruption and thus ease the path towards overall 
economic reform in both institutions. 
b) Public supervisory bodies should enhance the 
actual implementation of corporate governance 
practices through increasing listed companies 
managers and staffs’ awareness of the possible 
benefits of the effective adoption of the Egyptian 
corporate governance guidelines. 
c) Establishing a better legal environment which 
assures effective law enforcement equally among all 
parties without any exceptions. Filtering any 
unnecessary regulations is also crucial in this 
context. 
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d) The Egyptian accountants and legal auditors 
association should be in charge of auditing the 
corporation’s financial reports and ensuring 
compliance with the disclosure of corporate 
governance related practices through listed 
companies’ corporate governance reports.  
e) Enhancing the role of other financial 
institutions (especially through banks) in increasing 
compliance with the Egyptian corporate governance 
guidelines among listed companies. In this regard 
granting loans and credit could require the effective 
implementation of corporate governance practices 
as one of the main perquisites.  
f) Increasing Egyptian investors’ awareness of 
the importance of corporate governance practices in 
protecting their rights. This process can be 
initialized primarily through various mass media 
channels in contribution with the Egyptian Stock 
Exchange. Shareholders awareness can by time 
cause pressure on listed companies towards 
complying with the Egyptian corporate governance 
guidelines. 
 
7. CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The paper contributes to existing literature by 
investigating the impact of transparency and 
disclosure as a corporate governance mechanism on 
listed companies’ performance in an emerging 
capital market as the Egyptian one. Accordingly, this 
paper is the first to use an objective transparency 
and disclosure index extracted from the Egyptian 
corporate governance guidelines to study this 
relationship among a sample of Egyptian listed 
companies. 
Generally, our findings are in line with Samaha 
and Dahawy (2010) as well as Samaha et al. (2012) 
who also found low compliance and disclosure 
levels with CG related information. They attribute 
this status to the ineffectiveness and inadequacy in 
the regulatory framework in Egypt besides socio-
economic factors in Egypt including the unbalanced 
political situation, prevalent corruption, 
deteriorating law and order situation and the 
influence of the social elite, under developed 
corporate culture, less CG awareness and a very 
slow learning curve in case of a relatively new and 
developing stock market as the Egyptian one. 
Consequently, we confirm that the effective 
implementation of corporate governance practices 
in general and consequently transparency and 
disclosure practices being a corporate governance 
supervisory tool needs a lot of changes both 
culturally and professionally besides the 
contribution among various parties including 
government supervisory bodies, financial (mainly 
banking) institutions, listed companies board of 
directors’ members, management and staff as well 
as Egyptian investors.  
Possible limitations for our study could be the 
inclusion of only the highest trading firms in the 
sample which can make the results not generalized 
across all companies in Egypt. Another limitation is 
that we use the data from only one country and thus 
do not take the interaction of country-level factors 
into account. In addition, the model built in this 
paper focused only on including company specific 
factors while disregarding country related factors 
such as low law enforcement, corruption, low 
investors awareness, deficiency of managerial skills 
as well as relevant culture related factors.  
Based on our study of the impact of the 
transparency and disclosure practices as a main 
internal corporate governance mechanism on the 
performance of Egyptian listed companies, we 
suggest that future research focus on the following: 
a) More empirical research should be conducted on 
the applicability of the agency theory on developing 
countries. Future research should thus be extended 
to investigate the impact of existing corporate 
governance practices in general and transparency 
and disclosure practice in specific on companies’ 
performance especially among other developing 
markets in order to determine the generality of our 
results from the Egyptian context.  
b) Including more country-level factors as well as 
variables that relate to the context of culture rather 
than company level factors when in an attempt to 
build models that can better explain corporate 
governance practices in general and the level of 
disclosure in specific especially when studying 
developing countries. 
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